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The eet of the topology on the spatial ultimatum game
M. N. Kuperman and S. Risau Gusman
Centro Atómio Barilohe and Instituto Balseiro, 8400 S. C. de Barilohe, Argentina
Consejo Naional de Investigaiones Cientías y Ténias, Argentina
In this work we present an analysis of a spatially non homogeneous ultimatum game. By onsid-
ering dierent underlying topologies as substrates on top of whih the game takes plae we obtain
nontrivial behaviors for the evolution of the strategies of the players. We analyze separately the
eet of the size of the neighborhood and the spatial struture. Whereas this last eet is the
most signiant one, we show that even for disordered networks and provided the neighborhood of
eah site is small, the results an be signiantly dierent from those obtained in the ase of fully
onneted networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last years, Game Theory has been reognized as
a powerful alternative way to examining eonomis [1, 2℄.
The models analyzed under this sheme onsists of sets
of agents that play a ertain game and a set of the strate-
gies that an be used by the agents. Game theory an
be understood as a mathematial tool for analyzing and
prediting human behavior in strategi situations. In the
last years many physiist have direted their attention to-
wards the analysis of several market games [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8℄
The equilibrium analysis assume that all the players
display strategi thinking and optimizing behavior. How-
ever, it is widely aepted, and has been experimentally
shown, that not every player behaves in a rational way.
The realization of this dierene led to the reation of
Behavioral Eonomis, a branh of eonomis losely re-
lated to the study of the behavior of eonomial agents
rather than eonomial quantities [9, 10℄. One of the
most interesting results obtained in this eld is the ob-
servation that real individuals do not behave aording
to the lassial assumptions of homo eonomius [11℄, a
ompletely rational individual who seeks to optimize his
utilities with the least possible ost.
The gap between eonomis and Game Theory has
been bridged by Evolutionary Game Theory, whih takes
into aount the possibility that the strategies of the
agents an hange following some evolutionary rule. The
Evolutionary Game Theory has sueeded in explaining
how ooperation an arise in populations playing non-
ooperative games, i.e. in games where ooperation is
possible but is not favored. Inluded in the group of
non-ooperative games with eonomial interest we nd
the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Ultimatum Game, bargain-
ing games, et.
In the present work we fous on some aspets related
to the Ultimatum Game. The essential features of this
game an be very easily summarized. Two individuals
are told that they have the opportunity to split a given
amount of externally provided money. One of the in-
dividuals is randomly hosen as the rst player and to
assume the role of the oerer. He/she has to make a one
time oer, onsisting in indiating how muh of the total
amount of money is to be given to eah player. The other
player, as the respondent, has the opportunity to either
aept or rejet this oer. If the oer is rejeted both
get nothing. If the oer is aepted, eah one gets the
aorded part. Both partiipants are aware of the rules
of the game before making any deision.
The Ultimatum Game is a partiular ase of bargain-
ing. Game theory predits that the best strategy is to
oer an unequal split favoring the oerer. In [12℄ it is
shown that if ǫ is the lowest allowed partition and given
that a rational responder will prefer a small amount to
nothing, the best strategy for the oerer is to give just
ǫ and take the rest. But studies made by behavioral
eonomists have shown that most of the time real indi-
viduals tend to rejet unequal oers. The rst studies
are desribed in [13℄. Sine then there have been exten-
sive studies on the behaviors of the players under dier-
ent irumstanes and within a wide spetra of ultural
environments. Their results do not lead to a unique be-
havioral prole, and in partiular they show learly that
human players usually do not at as the homo eonomi-
us [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20℄.
It has also been shown ([21℄) that inequity aversion
may not be a exlusively human feature: brown apuhin
monkeys (Cebus Capella) seem to respond negatively to
unequal reward distribution in exhanges with a human
experimenter.
In order to explore the ultimatum game beyond the
"stati" formulation by Rubinstein [12℄, some authors
have analyzed the evolutionary ultimatum game [22, 23,
24, 25, 26℄. In these works it is shown that when the
agents are plaed in an ordered network (and therefore
onstrained to play with, and imitate, only their neigh-
bors) the evolution takes the system to more equitable
strategies than predited by the rational players hypothe-
sis. One natural question that arises is whether this eet
is only due to the spatial distribution of the players or it
is also due to the fat that the players are restrited to
play and imitate only a very small number of agents.
One of the goals of this work is to stress the important
role played by the underlying topology. Notie that or-
dered networks dier from the fully mixed ase not only
in that agents are onneted to a very small set of other
agents, but also on the fat that the lustering is muh
smaller, i.e. the neighbors of a site are not neessarily
onneted among themselves. In this work we analyze
2these features separately to understand the eet they
have on the evolution of strategies.
We show that some eld results an be in orrespon-
dene with our ndings. For example, in [16℄ it is shown
that the behavior of players annot be univoally assoi-
ated neither with the rational nor the altruisti attitudes.
On the ontrary, experiments aross dierent ultural en-
vironments show that it is spread over a wide spetra of
possibilities. This result was mentioned but not disussed
in previous works. At the same time we establish interest-
ing relationships between the outome of an evolutionary
situation and the underlying soial topology.
II. THE MODEL
The model onsists of a set of N players loated on a
network, whih denes the neighborhood of eah player,
i.e. the subset of the whole population that is available
for interation. Eah player i is assigned a playing strat-
egy that onsists of a pair of real numbers (oi, ai) within
the interval [0, 1]. An interation onsists in taking a pair
of linked players, and let them play twie, alternating the
roles of oerer and respondent. oi is the oer of player i
when ating as oerer, and ai is the smallest amount i a-
epts when ating as respondent. The total sum allotted
in eah game is 1.
The temporal evolution of the game is organized into
generations. In eah generation, eah player interats
with all of its neighbors. The payo of i when playing
with j, wij is
wij =


1− oi + oj if oi ≥ ai and oj ≥ ai
1− oi if oi ≥ ai and oj < ai
oj if oi < ai and oj ≥ ai
0 if oi < ai and oj < ai
(1)
After eah agent has played with its entire neighbor-
hood we ompute the umulative payo of eah individ-
ual and onsider that a game generation has onluded.
It is at this moment that the evolutionary dynamis takes
plae. In the next generation all the players are replaed
by their ospring. The strategy of a site is updated by
hoosing one strategy in the neighborhood (inluding the
site to be updated) with probability equal to the ratio
between the individual umulative payo and the total
umulative payo of all the sites in the neighborhood.
This warrants a ompetition proess in whih only the
ttest or more suessful strategies survive. In the next
generation, a new breed of players oupies the sites of
the network, with reset payos but with strategies deter-
mined by the outome of the previous generation. The
fat that a strategy was suessful in a given generation
does not guarantee its suess in the next one, with a
dierent distribution of strategies.
To avoid the system to get stuk in spurious loal min-
ima, we add some noise in the form of small mutations,
assoiated to a mutation rate ǫ [23℄. One the proess of
reprodution is nished by determining whih player will
leave its ospring in whih sites, the desendants opy
their anestor strategy with a small variation: if the in-
dividual that formerly oupied the site m leaves a de-
sendant in the plae l, the strategy of the new oupant
of the site l is then
(ol(t+ 1), al(t+ 1)) = (om(t) + δo, am(t) + δa) (2)
with δ ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ] a real random number.
We have performed simulations in three dierent
topologies: ordered, disordered, and k-Small World Net-
works (k-SWN), to interpolate smoothly between the or-
dered and disordered topologies. The ordered topology
onsists of nodes on a ring, joined to their rst k neigh-
bors to eah side. These networks are highly lustered:
many neighbors of eah node are onneted among them-
selves, forming triangles. This harateristi is quantied
by the lustering oeient whih is the number of tri-
angles entered on eah node divided by the number of
pairs of neighbors, averaged over all the nodes. The dis-
ordered topology we onsider is a random graph where
all the nodes have the same degree 2k (also alled regular
random graphs). The third topology is a variation of the
small world networks of Watts and Strogatz (WS)[27℄.
The algorithm of onstrution of WS networks is as
follows: starting from an ordered network, the ring is
traversed and with probability p′ eah link is rewired
to a random node. Double and self links are not al-
lowed. Though the algorithm onserves the total number
of links, at the end of the proess the degree of eah node
is statistially haraterized by a binomial distribution,
for p′ > 1. As we are interested in ltering any eet
related to hanges in the size of the neighborhoods we
modify the original WS algorithm to onstrain the result-
ing networks to a subfamily with a delta shaped degree
distribution. We all this family of networks the k-Small
World Networks (k-SWN), where 2k indiates the degree
of the nodes. We start again from an ordered network
and dene a disorder parameter p that plays a role anal-
ogous to that of p′ in WS networks. To proeed with
the reonnetion of the network we hoose two ouples of
linked nodes (or partners) rather than one. With proba-
bility p we deide whether to swith or not the partners
in order to get two new pairs of oupled links. In this way
all the nodes preserve their degree while the proess of
reonnetion assures the introdution of a ertain degree
of disorder. It must be stressed that the dependene with
p of the lustering oeient and path length is qualita-
tively similar to what is observed as a funtion of p′ in
SWNs.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The simulations were done on networks with 103 - 104
individuals and dierent values of k. Dening a gener-
ation as the situation when eah player plays twie (as
oerer and as respondent) with all his/her neighbors we
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FIG. 1: Asymptoti mean thresholds < o > (full symbols)
and < a > (empty symbols) for agents in a k-small world
network, as a funtion of the node degree k. Squares: Ordered
Network, Cirles: Regular Random Network
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FIG. 2: Asymptoti mean thresholds < o > (full symbols)
and < a > (empty symbols) for agents in a k-small world net-
work, as a funtion of the disorder parameter of the network.
Squares: k = 2, Cirles: k = 3
performed time averages over the last 106 generations of
eah realization, after a transient equally long. At the
same time, the time averaged results for a given set of
parameters p and k were obtained after averaging over
100 individual ases.
We begin by showing the omparison (see Fig 1) be-
tween the strategies attained by agents plaed in a ring,
eah one onneted to its rst k neighbors, and the ones
attained when playing in a regular random graph (i.e. a
graph where eah node is onneted to exatly k ran-
dom neighbors). These last networks have a vanishing
lustering oeient, whih means that, loally, they are
isomorphi to trees. On the other hand, the networks
dened on the ring have a lustering that inreases with
k: c = 3
4
k−2
k−1
. It is interesting to see that evolution in a
ompletely disordered network an also lead to strategies
that are rather far from the rational predition, provided
that the number of neighbors is small enough. On the
other hand, a small inrease in the number of neighbors
leads to strategies muh loser to the rational predition.
This eet is muh less pronouned in the ase of the ring
networks but it must be borne in mind that lustering is
also inreasing in this ase. The eet of lustering an
be grasped by omparing the urves for xed values of k:
larger lustering seems to lead to the evolution of more
equitable strategies. To analyze this in more detail we
have performed simulations of the Ultimatum Game in
k-Small World Networks.
As we vary the disorder parameter p we observe a
monotonous smooth behavior of the values of < o > and
< a >. In Fig. 2 we show the mean values of < o >
as a funtion of the disorder parameter p (< a > is not
shown, as its behavior is very similar). The behavior
of this quantity looks qualitatively very similar to that
of the lustering oeient. To stress this fat we have
plotted < o > vs. C in Fig. 3, where an almost linear
dependene an be observed.
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FIG. 3: Asymptoti mean thresholds < o > for agents in a
k-small world network, as a funtion of the lustering of the
network. Squares: k = 2, Cirles: k = 3
IV. INVASION ANALYSIS
When studying the dynamis of systems embedded
in ordered or semiordered networks it is diult to go
beyond numerial simulations. Diret analytial ap-
proahes usually beome impossibly ompliated in the
4presene of short loops. For this reasons people have
used indiret approahes with the hope of apturing the
essene of the problem.
One possibility to study the asymptoti state is to al-
ulate the strategy that a luster of mutants should have
to invade an homogeneous population. The behavior of
this as the topology is hanged has been shown to give
some lues about the asymptoti state of dierent sys-
tems [29, 30℄. We have performed these alulations for
the limit ases of a ompletely ordered and a ompletely
disordered network. The alulation is analogous to the
one in [22℄, where only the onditions for invasion of
lusters of two and three sites were onsidered, for the
ordered network with k = 2. In an innite population
of individuals with oer and aeptane thresholds set
to ob and ab, a luster of n mutants is introdued, with
oer and aeptane thresholds set to om and am with
om > am > ob > ab. For this initial state we derive
the ondition o < oc(k) that must be satised for the
mutants to leave more than n desendants in the next
generation (this is only a rst approximation, beause
mutant expansion might not ontinue indenitely [30℄).
Notie that for a homogeneous population, with mutation
allowed, the average thresholds should be bigger that oc.
Otherwise a mutation ould generate a mutant luster
that would invade the population, thus raising the aver-
age threshold.
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FIG. 4: Critial invasion thresholds as a funtion of the de-
gree of the nodes and for a luster size 2 (full symbols) and 3
(empty symbols). Squares: Ordered Network, Cirles: Regu-
lar Random Network
The behavior of oc(k) for lusters of two and three
sites, in ordered and ompletely disordered networks is
shown in Fig 4. The derease of both urves with k was
to be expeted, beause if a luster has a strategy well
suited for invading the population, inreasing the number
of its neighbors an only add to its suess. A more in-
teresting feature is the relationship between both urves
for the same value of k. In this ase the lusters have
the same number of onnetions, but they dier in how
these onnetions are arranged: in the ompletely disor-
dered network all these onnetions go to dierent agents,
whereas in the ordered network the two members of it are
onneted mostly to the same sites (i.e. there are more
triangles). Thus, the gure shows that ating ooper-
atively leads to better reprodutive hanes, and this is
favored in networks with larger lustering oeient. No-
tie that the average payo of the agents is the same in
the two ases. It is their relative tness what hanges.
The same features are present when one ompares the
invasion thresholds for larger ompat lusters, if their
size does not depend on k.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The rationale of the present work was to reveal the in-
uene of the underlying topology on the outome of an
evolutionary Ultimatum Game. Though previous works
have already addressed this aspet, some interesting de-
tails ould only be unveiled through a more detailed anal-
ysis. This task was ahieved by making numerial simula-
tions on several types of networks, with dierent amount
of disorder and degree distribution. We have observed
that both the inrease of the neighborhood size and the
inrease of the degree of disorder have a similar eet,
leading a population of players towards responses with
inreasing levels of "rationality". As the inrement of the
size of the neighborhood makes a given network onverge
towards a fully onneted graph and thus being assoi-
ated to a mean eld situation, the eet of the inrease
on the disorder was not lear up to now. We have shown
the transition in the behavior of the population when
the underlying topology varies ontinuously between the
extremes already studied in the literature.
The behavior of the asymptoti state of the system as
the lustering of the underlying network hanges an be
ompared to that of some games where the evolution of
ooperation is analyzed. Individuals with fair strategies
an survive provided that they are surrounded by neigh-
bors with similar behavior. A highly lustered network
favors this neessary ondition and the system naturally
evolves to a situation when the mean level of oers is
around 50%. On the ontrary, when the underlying net-
work present a low level of lusterization, the mean val-
ues go to values lose to zero. In this ase, the transient
shows rst a diminishing aeptane threshold, that -
nally drives the oer value to lower values as well, as
shown in Figure 5. If we identify the fair strategies as
being more ooperative that those with lower oers the
results an be interpreted within the frame of the phe-
nomenology of other ooperative games where the spatial
distribution plays the same role as here and leads to the
same qualitative results.
So far, we have made a desription and analysis of the
obtained results. After analyzing our results we are in-
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FIG. 5: Temporal behavior of the thresholds < o > (full) and
< a > (dotted) in the fully onneted network
lined to propose an explanation for the emergene of a
olletive behavior that sets a disrepany between the
theoretial preditions and eld results in relation to the
ultimatum game. Furthermore, the experimental results
show a wide spetra of behaviors that ould not be eas-
ily explained or unied within a suitable frame. In this
work we study an evolutionary proess that hanges the
strategies of the populations and an lead to the sur-
vival of the ttest behaviors. The nal omposition of
the evolutionary strategies of the population seems to
depend on the soial underlying arhiteture. This ould
explain, in priniple, the fat that people with dierent
soial organization display dierent olletive behaviors.
The model sueeds to qualitatively reprodue the om-
plexity of the observed experimental results based on very
simple assumptions and interation rules. Summarizing
we show that the whole spetra of observed behaviors
an be reprodued by onsidering an evolutionary pro-
ess that together with the subtleties of the soial orga-
nization shapes the behavior of dierent people.
VI. APPENDIX
We onsider a population of agents with oer and a-
eptane thresholds set to p0 and q0 < p0, with two on-
neted mutants with thresholds pm > qm > p0 > q0.
Agents an be onneted to none, one, or both mutants,
depending on the topology of the network. Their respe-
tive average payo after a round of games will be:
f0(k) = 2k
f1(k) = 2k − 1 + p
f2(k) = 2k − 2 + 2p (3)
where 2k is the number of neighbors. For the mutants,
the payo is:
fm(k) = 1 + (2k − 1)(1− p) (4)
At the next generation, the new strategy for eah site is
hosen randomly among its own and its neighbors strate-
gies, with a probability proportional to their respetive
average payos. Thus, the expeted number of mutants
at the next generation is:
m(k) =
4fm(k)
2fm(k) + (2k − 1)f1(k)
+
(2k − 1)fm(k)
fm(k) + f1(k) + (2k − 1)f0(k)
(5)
for the disordered ase and
m(k) = 2
2fm(k)
2fm(k) + 2(k − 1)f2(k) + f1(k)
+
k−1∑
j=1
2fm(k)
2fm(k) + (2k − 2− j)f2(k) + f1(k) + jf0(k)
+
fm(k)
fm(k) + (k − 1)f2(k) + f1(k) + kf0(k)
(6)
for the ompletely ordered ase. The invasion ondition
for p an then be extrated from the equation m(k) > 2.
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